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Abstract 
This dissertation compares the historiography of the Sino-Tibetan relationship as 
written by a number of Chinese, Tibetan and Western historians. The relationship 
between China and Tibet has been written about extensively, however the highly 
politicised nature of modern debate has resulted in an inability of historians to reach a 
consensus regarding the status of Tibet. This dissertation will use the 1950-1951 
occupation of Tibet by China as a foundation from which to compare the historiography 
of the Sino-Tibetan relationship during the Chinese Tang, Yuan, Ming and Qing 
Dynasties, and during the Republic of China. This dissertation will also discuss which 
historiographical schools and modes of thought have influenced historians. Tibetan 
historians have been strongly influenced by modern Tibetan ethnocentric nationalism, 
and by Western romanticised constructions of Tibet. Chinese historians have been 
influenced by a combination of traditional Chinese thought and Marxist thought. The 
hegemony of Western political ideas has also caused Tibetan and Chinese historians to 
frame their arguments around Western concepts. Western historians attempt to be 
objective, however tend to agree with the interpretation of Tibetan historians. This is 
largely due to the influence of the romanticised image of Tibet in the West, which 
creates the idea that Tibet is a peaceful and traditional place which has been violated by 
Chinese aggression.  
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Glossary 
Amban: a high official who represented the Qing Dynasty in Tibet. 
Dalai Lama: the highest ranking lama in the Gelug school of Tibetan Buddhism. 
Panchen Lama: the second highest ranking lama in the Gelug school of Tibetan 
Buddhism. 
Plenipotentiary: a diplomat invested with the full power to act on behalf of their 
government. 
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Author’s Note 
A problem with any scholarship dealing with Sino-Tibetan history is defining what 
areas are meant by ‘China’ and ‘Tibet’. The boundaries which define the areas that 
make up each of these nations have changed throughout history. For example, under the 
leadership of Srongtsen Gampo during the seventh century, Tibet had a military 
expansionist policy and gained large amounts of territory from China.  
The majority of the historiography studied in this dissertation discusses the status of 
Tibet in relation to debate regarding the 1950-1951 occupation of Tibet by China. 
Therefore, when referring to ‘Tibet’, this dissertation generally means the area currently 
known as the Tibet Autonomous Region.  
At various times throughout history, Han China belonged to a wider empire, such as the 
Mongol Yuan Dynasty and the Manchu Qing Dynasty. However, because this 
dissertation discusses arguments that Tibet has historically belonged to Han China, 
when referring to ‘China’, this dissertation refers to Han China.   
6 
 
Introduction 
The status of Tibet is a globally contested issue which is reflected in the highly 
politicised and divergent historical interpretations of the Sino-Tibetan relationship. 
Several extensive histories examine the long and changing relationship between China 
and Tibet from the seventh century through to the twentieth century. From 1950-1951, 
China occupied Tibet and signed the ‘Agreement of the Central People's Government 
and the Local Government of Tibet on Measures for the Peaceful Liberation of Tibet’, 
colloquially referred to as the Seventeen Point Agreement. This was the first time in 
Sino-Tibetan history that Tibet formally and unequivocally became part of the Chinese 
state.1 By examining the historiography of the relationship between China and Tibet 
prior to this event, several periods can be identified as significant for determining the 
status of Tibet. These include the status of Tibet under each of the Tang, Yuan, Ming 
and Qing dynasties, and its status in relation to the Republic of China between 1911 and 
1949. The relationship between China and Tibet during these periods has been used by 
Chinese historians to argue that Tibet has historically belonged to China. Tibetan 
historians have interpreted the same information to claim that while Tibet has always 
had a relationship with China, it has remained autonomous.  
This dissertation will critically evaluate several Chinese, Tibetan and Western 
historical sources to establish the main themes in the historiographical debate 
concerning the relationship between China and Tibet. This will include an examination 
of work by professional historians as well as historical sources written with explicitly 
political aims by the governments of China and Tibet. Many of these sources are broad 
                                                          
1 M.C. Goldstein, The Snow Lion and the Dragon: China, Tibet, and the Dalai Lama, Los 
Angeles, University of California Press, 1997, p. 47. 
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histories of Tibet covering its status under the Tang dynasty through to the 1950s, 
allowing a critical examination of how the same historical ‘facts’ are used in Chinese, 
Tibetan and Western historiography to verify competing political aims. The Tibetan and 
Chinese sources that this dissertation will examine have been written in English to 
appeal to a Western audience and gain support for their version of history. These 
sources have all been published since the 1950-1951 occupation of Tibet. The main 
lines of argument made by Chinese, Tibetan and Western historians regarding the status 
of Tibet have remained relatively consistent since the 1950s. There has been an increase 
in the amount of material published on the subject due to the influence of the increasing 
international attention being paid to the modern political situation in Tibet. 
While there are many histories written about the relationship between China and 
Tibet, there is a relative dearth of analysis of the politicisation of these histories. The 
definitive work on the subject is John Powers’ 2004 book History as Propaganda: 
Tibetan Exiles versus the People’s Republic of China. Powers conducts a comparative 
study of Chinese, Tibetan and Western histories, focusing on language and discourse in 
his interpretation of the historiography. While other academic works examine specific 
aspects of the historiography, such as the effect of Western imagination on the image of 
Tibet,2 no other work seeks to continue Powers’ efforts to analyse and compare these 
contentious histories. 
                                                          
2 D. Anand, ‘The Tibet Question and the West: Issues of Sovereignty, Identity, and 
Representation,’ in B. Sautman and J.T. Dreyer (ed.), Contemporary Tibet: Politics, 
Development and Society in a Disputed Region, New York, M.E. Sharpe, 2006, pp. 285-304; R. 
Barnett, ‘Violated Specialness: Western Political Representations of Tibet’, in T. Dodin and H. 
Räther (ed.), Imagining Tibet: Perceptions, Projections and Fantasies, Boston, Wisdom 
Publications, 2001, pp. 269-316; D.S. Lopez Jr. Prisoners of Shangri-La: Tibetan Buddhism 
and the West, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1998; D. Anand, Geopolitical Exotica: 
Tibet in Western Imagination, Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 2007. 
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In 1950, China’s People’s Liberation Army marched into Lhasa in what has 
been described by different historians as variously a ‘liberation’ and an ‘invasion’.3 The 
contemporary Chinese government stated that they were liberating Tibet from foreign 
imperialist aggression, which was achieved with the signing of the Seventeen Point 
Agreement in 1951. This event was a major turning point in the history of the Sino-
Tibetan relationship as it was the first time that China definitively exerted sovereignty 
over Tibet.4 For many Chinese, Tibetan and Western historians, the interpretation of 
previous periods of Sino-Tibetan history either legitimises or refutes China’s claim to 
Tibet, which was exerted during the 1950-1951 occupation. These histories therefore 
often display a high degree of presentism, which is the interpretation of historical events 
in terms of modern concepts and ideas.5 
Chinese historiography has been influenced by a strong hatred of foreign 
imperialism, which it regards as responsible for both China’s own weakness during the 
nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries, and for Tibet’s desire to gain independence.6 
However, Chinese thought has also been influenced by Western thought. Duara argues 
that twentieth century Chinese intelligentsia were forced to adopt a linear, progressive 
model of history in order to legitimise their historical claim to Tibet in the modern 
political climate.7 Despite a defiance of Western political hegemony, Chinese historians 
                                                          
3 China Tibet Online, ‘Peaceful Liberation of Tibet’, 2011, 
http://eng.tibet.cn/2010ls/xxhpjf/201101/t20110121_869402.html, (accessed 9 June 2015); 
Central Tibetan Administration, ‘Tibet: Proving Truth From Facts’, 2006, 
http://tibet.net/1996/01/tibet-proving-truth-from-facts-1996/ (accessed 19 June 2015). 
4 H.E. Richardson, Tibet and its History, London, Oxford University Press, 1962, p. 98. 
5 ‘Presentism’, Oxford English Dictionary, 2015, 
http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/266885?redirectedFrom=presentism& (accessed 13 October 
2015). 
6 W.W. Smith Jr., Tibetan Nation: A History of Tibetan Nationalism and Sino-Tibetan 
Relations, Colorado, Westview Press, 1996, p. 278. 
7 P. Duara, ‘Postcolonial History’, in S. Maza and L. Kramer (ed.), A Companion to Western 
Historical Thought, Oxford, Blackwell Publishers, 2002, pp. 423-424. 
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readily use Western political concepts of sovereignty and statehood to discuss the Sino-
Tibetan relationship, although these concepts were foreign to both China and Tibet prior 
to the twentieth century.8  
The adoption of western modes of thought is juxtaposed with the continued 
influence of traditional Chinese ways of viewing history. Chinese historians are deeply 
influenced by the irredentist belief that Tibet has always been part of China. This is an 
effect of the enduring Chinese medieval mentality that China was the centre of the 
world and that all other nations had a natural urge to be incorporated into the Chinese 
state.9 China has a deep respect for its history and ancestors and a long tradition of using 
history to justify political action.10 This has influenced the teleological and tendentious 
viewpoint represented in most Chinese historiography which argues that the 1950-1951 
occupation of Tibet by China was a liberation, welcomed by the Tibetan state.11 
Many Tibetan histories are produced or influenced by the Tibetan Government-
in-Exile or are written by wealthy and elite Tibetans who support Tibetan 
independence.12 Although presenting a relatively monolithic view of Sino-Tibetan 
history, these works cannot be relied upon as representative of all Tibetan perspectives. 
Like Chinese historiography, Tibetan historiography has become more politically 
charged over time, with recent online sources reiterating that not only was Tibet 
independent prior to the 1950-1951 invasion, but that the Seventeen Point Agreement is 
                                                          
8 Anand, Contemporary Tibet, pp. 285-286. 
9 Richardson, Tibet and Its History, p. 188. 
10 Ibid, p. 188. 
11 Ibid, p. 188. 
12 T. Gyatso, Freedom in Exile: The Autobiography of the Dalai Lama, David Howarth (ed.), 
London, Hodder and Stoughton, 1990.; T.W.D. Shakabpa, Tibet: A Political History, New 
York, Potala Publications, 1984; T.J. Norbu and C. Turnbull, Tibet: Its History, Religion and 
People, Harmondsworth, Penguin Books, 1972. 
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void under international law and that Tibet retains its independence to this day, although 
under illegal occupation by China.13 Shakya’s 1999 work is milder in his critique of the 
Chinese, stating that Communist troops in 1950-1951 adopted a policy of appeasement, 
with the relationship between monks and Communists being quite friendly.14 However 
his work is the exception, with other Tibetan historians painting a stark picture of 
Chinese wrongdoings.  
The attitude of these historians has been heavily influenced by postcolonialism 
and Tibetan nationalism. Tibetan historians argue for independence by conferring 
agency on Tibetans as key actors in their own history. However Tibetan nationalism has 
also fostered a sense of nostalgia for traditional Tibetan society. This has also been a 
response to Western constructions of Tibetans as a naïve people whose history has been 
arranged by greater powers. The Western infantilisation of Tibet has been appropriated 
by Tibetan nationalist historians who use the image of a naïve and peaceful Tibet to 
garner international support.15 This use of Western essentialism can be seen in itself as a 
form of historical agency. Tibetan historians exert their agency by constructing Tibet as 
a unique, non-Western culture, while also framing the argument for Tibetan 
independence within Western political terms. Tibetan historians argue that the events of 
1950-1951 were an invasion, based on the idea that Tibet was independent from 1911-
1949. However, historically Tibet had never needed to explicitly claim its independence 
because its relationships with its neighbours were on terms of ‘mutually inclusive and 
                                                          
13 Central Tibetan Administration, ‘Tibet: Proving Truth From Facts’; Free Tibet, ‘Is Tibet a 
Country?’, http://freetibet.org/about/legal-status-tibet, (accessed 19 June, 2015).  
14 T. Shakya, The Dragon in the Land of Snows: A History of Modern Tibet Since 1947, 
London, Pimlico, 1999, p. 35. 
15 Anand, Contemporary Tibet, p. 298; D. Anand, ‘Western Colonial Representations of the 
Other: The Case of Exotica Tibet’, New Political Science, vol. 29, no. 1, 2007, p. 42. 
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overlapping territorial jurisdiction’ which did not adhere to Western concepts of 
sovereignty.16 
Western historians attempt to adhere to the goal of objectivity idealised by the 
Western historical discipline. As such, Western historians are far less teleological in 
their analysis of the status of Tibet and the legitimacy of the Chinese occupation of 
Tibet.17 Western historiography has been split into two major schools of thought, both 
of which have remained relatively stable over time. One on hand are those historians 
who support Tibet’s claim to independence and are highly critical of China’s actions in 
Tibet, and on the other hand are those who attempt to be more even-handed. Historians 
of the first school argue that Tibet had undoubtedly been operating with de facto 
independence since 1911 and was forced to sign the Seventeen Point Agreement out of 
necessity.18 Historians of the second school attempt to be more favourable towards 
China in their analysis. Grunfeld states that while the Chinese did not shamelessly 
coerce the Tibetans into signing the Seventeen Point Agreement, the Tibetans were 
negotiating from a weak position, enabling the Chinese to control most of the content of 
the agreement.19  
While there are Western historians who are more sympathetic to China than 
others, none of the historians studied are uncompromisingly pro-Chinese and supportive 
                                                          
16 Anand, Contemporary Tibet, p. 289. 
17 Most Western historians discuss only Tibet’s history since 1911 when analysing the nature of 
the 1950-1951 invasion. T.A. Grunfeld, The Making of Modern Tibet, New York, M. E. Sharpe, 
1996, pp. 78-114. 
18 H. E. Richardson, Tibet and Its History, pp. 185-189.; S. Karmay, ‘Under what circumstances 
did the PLA decide to march into Tibet?’, in A. Blondeau and K. Buffetrille (ed.), 
Authenticating Tibet: Answers to China’s 100 Questions, Los Angeles, University of California 
Press, 2008, p. 56. 
19 Grunfeld, The Making of Modern Tibet, p. 113; Goldstein, The Snow Lion and the Dragon, 
pp. 44-46; Smith Jr., Tibetan Nation, p. 296. 
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of Chinese sovereignty in Tibet in the way that several Western historians are staunchly 
pro-Tibetan. The greater tendency towards a pro-Tibetan analysis is both a reaction 
against the strongly political and uncompromising conclusions of Chinese 
historiography and a result of the romanticisation of Tibet. The image of a peaceful 
Tibet is constructed as an antidote to the Western perception of the violence of Chinese 
communism.20  This is exhibited in the portrayal of the Chinese 1950-1951 occupation 
of Tibet in Western historiography. The majority of Western historians describe the 
military force and power of the Chinese Communists in contrast to the helplessness of 
the peaceful Tibetans, which left them with no alternative but to sign the Seventeen 
Point Agreement.21 This romanticised image of Tibet is a legacy of imperial Orientalism 
in Western thought which constructs Tibet as a counterbalance to Western modernity. 
This involves the essentialising and infantilising of Tibetans as a highly religious, 
peaceful and naïve people.22 The romanticisation of Tibet has often described it as if 
fixed in time and as an antidote to modernity.23 This Western representation has not 
only influenced Western historiography to be more pro-Tibetan, but has influenced 
Tibetan historians by constructing an image of Tibet which has then been appropriated 
by Tibetans as a method for portraying themselves, in order to gain Western political 
support.  
                                                          
20 Anand, Contemporary Tibet, p. 297. 
21 Grunfeld, The Making of Modern Tibet, p. 113; Goldstein, The Snow Lion and the Dragon, p. 
46; Smith Jr., Tibetan Nation, p. 296. 
22 A.C. McKay, ‘“Truth”, Perception, and Politics: The British Construction of an Image of 
Tibet’, in T. Dodin and H. Räther (ed.), Imagining Tibet: Perceptions, Projections and 
Fantasies, Boston, Wisdom Publications, 2001, p. 84; Anand, New Political Science, p. 25. 
23 D.K. Rinpoche, ‘Buddhism in the West and the Image of Tibet’, in T. Dodin and H. Räther 
(ed.), Imagining Tibet: Perceptions, Projections and Fantasies, Boston, Wisdom Publications, 
2001, p. 385. 
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This dissertation will examine the historiography of the Sino-Tibetan 
relationship in terms of the influence of these themes on historians. Chapter One will 
examine the changing nature of the Sino-Tibetan relationship during the Chinese Tang, 
Yuan and Ming Dynasties. It will demonstrate how Chinese dynastic changes impacted 
on the level of authority which China imposed on Tibet throughout these periods. It will 
include an analysis of key themes in the historiography such as Tibetan independence 
versus subordination, and the role which religion has played in the Sino-Tibetan 
relationship. Chapter Two will continue to explore these themes, focusing on Tibet’s 
relationship with China during the Qing Dynasty. This chapter will also examine the 
role which British imperialism began to play in the relationship during this period. 
Chapter Three will look at how the Sino-Tibetan relationship was affected by the 
Chinese Revolution in 1911 and the subsequent conversion of China from an imperial 
dynasty to a republic. Many Tibetan and Western historians argue that Tibet operated 
with de facto independence during this time. These periods of history are all key to the 
differing interpretations in the historiography of the nature of China’s occupation of 
Tibet in 1950-1951.  
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Tang, Yuan and Ming Dynasties 
Throughout the rise and fall of the Chinese Tang, Yuan and Ming Dynasties, a 
relationship existed between China and Tibet. The nature of this relationship and the 
way in which it changed is the subject of historiographical debate between Chinese, 
Tibetan and Western historians. Themes of independence, subordination and mutual 
influence have emerged in the historiography, with key events becoming focal points 
for debate concerning these themes. Historians writing on these periods of Sino-Tibetan 
history since the 1950s have been influenced by modern schools of historical thought. 
Tibetan historians have been influenced by postcolonialism in their desire to reclaim 
Tibetan agency and culture as unique and important outside of Tibet’s relationship with 
China. This has often led to a sense of nostalgia for what Tibetans regard as their 
Golden Age. Chinese historians argue that Tibet has always been a part of China. This 
interpretation is influenced both by Chinese Marxism and traditional Chinese thought. 
Western historians aspire to write objective histories but are strongly influenced by the 
romanticisation of the image of Tibet in the West. 
The theme of mutual influence between China and Tibet is debated in the 
historiography of the Tang Dynasty. Tibet was an independent monarchy during this 
period, but was influenced by its relationship with China through a process of cultural 
exchange. The Tibetan state emerged in the seventh century when King Srongtsen 
Gampo unified the Tibetan tribes, established a capital at Lhasa and began a process of 
military expansion. This period is known in Tibetan historiography as Tibet’s Golden 
Age and was a time when Tibet was a highly martial state.24 Tibetan historians have 
                                                          
24 S.S. Gyaltsen, The Clear Mirror: A Traditional Account of Tibet’s Golden Age, trans. M. 
Taylor and C. Yuthok, New York, Snow Lion Publications, 1996, pp. 13-15. 
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been influenced by postcolonial thought to emphasise Tibetan agency and autonomy 
throughout history, which has often led them to glorify this period. This is demonstrated 
in the interpretation of Gampo’s marriage to the Chinese Princess Wencheng in 641. 
Several Tibetan sources state that China offered Princess Wencheng in marriage to 
Srongtsen Gampo out of fear of Tibetan military supremacy.25 Norbu and Turnbull state 
that the Chinese Emperor initially resisted the marriage alliance, but that Gampo ‘began 
a military campaign, the might of which quickly persuaded the Chinese Emperor T’ai 
Tsung to change his mind’.26 This is supported by several Western historians, who put 
forward the idea that the Chinese Emperor only agreed to the marriage under threat of 
Tibetan military force.27 Chinese historians portray the marriage as a political move by 
the Tang Emperor to form an alliance with Tibet and bring it into the Chinese sphere of 
influence. The China Embassy website states that this marriage ‘[laid] the groundwork 
for the ultimate foundation of a unified nation’.28 
In 710, the Tibetan King Tride Zhotsan echoed Gampo’s marriage alliance when 
he married the Chinese Princess Jincheng. The cultural implications of Gampo’s and 
Zhotsan’s marriages to Chinese princesses have been remarked on by several historians 
in a debate over the mutual influence of Tibet and China. Both princesses brought in 
their dowries numerous books and fabrics and were accompanied by Chinese experts in 
arts, crafts and science.29 Chinese histories emphasise the influence of this influx of 
                                                          
25 Central Tibetan Administration, ‘Tibet: Proving Truth From Facts’. 
26 Norbu and Turnbull, Tibet: Its History, Religion and People, p. 143. 
27 H. Uebach, ‘The Tibetan Empire (Seventh-Ninth Centuries)’, in A. Blondeau and K. 
Buffetrille (ed.), Authenticating Tibet: Answers to China’s 100 Questions, Los Angeles, 
University of California Press, 2008, pp. 4-5; Smith Jr., Tibetan Nation, pp. 59-61. 
28 The Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in New Zealand, ‘The History of Tibet’, 
http://www.chinaembassy.org.nz/eng/zt/zgxz/xzgk/t39474.htm, (accessed 10 June 2015). 
29 Lobsang and J. Yun, ‘History and Anecdotes’, in Dai Y. et al., (ed.), Tibet: Myth vs Reality, 
Beijing, Beijing Review, 1988, pp. 17-18. 
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Chinese culture into Tibet and argue that it began the process of Tibetan unification 
with China.30 This Chinese interpretation is influenced by traditional Chinese thought 
which reflects the medieval belief that China was the centre of the world and that 
neighbouring barbaric peoples could not help but be pulled into the orbit of Chinese 
cultural superiority.31 Tibetan historians maintain that a two-way cultural exchange 
existed between Tibet and China. The fourteenth Dalai Lama emphasises Tibet’s 
differences from China despite this relationship:  
Tibetans are a distinct and separate race. Our physical appearance and our 
language and customs are entirely different from those of any of our 
neighbours. We have no ethnological connection with anyone else in our 
part of Asia.32  
Statements such as these reflect the influence of modern Tibetan ethnocentric 
nationalism on Tibetan historians.33 Tibetan historians emphasise the unique cultural 
identity of Tibet since the Tang Dynasty in order to prove the longevity of Tibetan 
nationalism. This is to provide legitimacy in the context of modern Tibet’s struggle for 
independence.34  
Buddhism is also a significant area of Tibetan culture which historians examine 
for evidence of mutual influence with China during the Tang Dynasty. The theme of 
mutual cultural influence during the Tang Dynasty is also debated in the historiography 
                                                          
30 J. Powers, History as Propaganda: Tibetan Exiles versus the People’s Republic of China, 
Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2004, pp. 30-31; The Embassy of the People’s Republic of 
China in New Zealand, ‘The History of Tibet’; Li T.T., The Historical Status of Tibet, New 
York, Columbia University Press, 1956, p. 9. 
31 Powers, History as Propaganda, pp. 32-36; Smith Jr., Tibetan Nation, p. 63. 
32 T. Gyatso, My Land and My People: The Autobiography of His Holiness the Dalai Lama, 
London, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1962, pp. 51-2. 
33 D. Norbu, Culture and the politics of Third World nationalism, London, Routledge, 1992, p. 
1. 
34 Anand, Geopolitical Exotica, p. 84. 
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with regards to Buddhism. The Chinese princesses Wencheng and Jincheng were both 
Buddhist and influenced Tibetan culture through the propagation of the religion. 
Because Buddhism has come to be regarded as a defining feature of Tibet in Western 
thought, Chinese historians strongly emphasise the Sino-Tibetan religious link as a way 
of sinicizing one of Tibet’s defining characteristics. Suo and Wang state that it was 
under Princess Wencheng’s influence that Srongtsen Gampo became a great Buddhist 
scholar and advocated Buddhism for Tibetans.35 However Tibetan historians are careful 
to discuss the influence of India on Tibetan Buddhism and to show that Tibet adapted 
aspects of both Chinese and Indian Buddhism in its adoption of the religion.36 Just as 
Chinese historians emphasise the link between China and Tibetan Buddhism, so Tibetan 
historians try to downplay this aspect of history in order to reclaim Buddhism as a 
unique feature of Tibetan culture. This religious debate has implications for Tibetan and 
Chinese historians who often portray Tibet in such a way as to garner support from the 
West for their historical viewpoint. Tibetan Buddhism has been spiritualised in Western 
literature to the point where Tibet has become a counter-image to Western modernity 
and power.37 The romanticisation of Tibet has influenced Western thought since 
European explorers entered the region during the Middle Ages.38 Geographic and 
political isolation has caused the image of Tibet in the West to be essentialised as a 
peaceful, religious, traditional place which is a panacea for Western modernity.39 For 
this reason, Chinese historians emphasise the cultural subordination of Tibet to Chinese 
                                                          
35 Suo W. and Wang F., Highlights of Tibetan History, Beijing, New World Press, 1984, p. 19. 
36 Shakabpa, Tibet: A Political History, pp. 36-39. 
37 Rinpoche, Imagining Tibet, p. 385. 
38 R. Kaschewsky, ‘The Image of Tibet in the West Before the Nineteenth Century’, T. Dodin 
and H. Räther (ed.), Imagining Tibet: Perceptions, Projections and Fantasies, Boston, Wisdom 
Publications, 2001, pp. 3-19. 
39 Rinpoche discusses the phenomenon of essentialising Tibet. Rinpoche, Imagining Tibet, p. 
385. 
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culture as a way of historically linking China with this positive image of Tibet in the 
West. Tibetan historians emphasise the uniqueness and separateness of Tibetan culture 
from China in order to historicise their national identity. 
The theme of independence versus subordination is discussed in the 
historiography of the Yuan Dynasty in the context of Tibet’s submission to the Mongol 
Emperors. In the early-thirteenth century, Genghis Khan established the Mongol 
Khanate north of China and began to expand his power in Asia. In 1253, the monk 
Phagpa, the nephew of the leader of the influential Sakya Buddhist sect, visited Kublai 
Khan, who accepted Phagpa as his religious teacher and established him as the ruler of 
Tibet, creating what came to be known as the priest-patron relationship. This 
relationship worked on the basis of spiritual guidance from Tibet in exchange for 
political support from the Mongols. The establishment of Phagpa as the political leader 
of Tibet was the first time that a religious lama had held temporal power in Tibet.40 The 
priest-patron relationship between Kublai and Phagpa established the accepted model 
for future Tibetan-Mongol relations. Tibetan historians have pointed out that it was a 
unique relationship which cannot be understood on Western political terms.41 Tibetan 
historians argue that Tibetan religious authority gave them the opportunity to exercise 
influence on the Mongol Emperors through the priest-patron relationship. While it is 
accepted in Tibetan, Chinese and Western historiography that Tibet was subordinate to 
the Mongol Emperors, Tibetan historians maintain that this was not the same as being 
subordinate to China. Despite evidence of mutual influence between Mongol Emperors 
and Tibetan religious leaders, Chinese historians still stress the submission of Tibet to 
China during this period. Jing argues that the Yuan Emperors exercised Chinese 
                                                          
40 Richardson, Tibet and Its History, p. 39. 
41 Shakabpa, Tibet: A Political History, pp. 71-73; Gyatso, My Land and My People, pp. 65-66. 
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sovereignty over Tibet through administrative measures such as appointing officials, 
levying taxes and taking censuses.42 This is a reflection of Confucian values, which 
stress the ‘mutual interdependence’ of any political relationship, but state that every 
relationship is also hierarchical.43 This means that even if Tibet and Mongol-ruled 
China exerted a mutual influence on each other, Tibet remained subordinate to China. 
Western historians generally support the Tibetan view that Tibet was subordinate to the 
Mongols but maintained a unique relationship which kept it autonomous from Han 
China. Richardson points out that Tibetan submission to Mongol power was confirmed 
before the Mongol domination of China was completed in 1279, proving that the 
Tibetan-Mongol relationship was independent from Han China.44 Many Western 
historians also point out that Tibet’s relationship with the Mongols was not solely 
religious as Tibet was also subject to military and political domination.45 Smith states 
that the Yuan Dynasty was sinicized to a large degree and that many Tibetan clerics 
served as religious officials in Han China, which provides a basis for the Chinese claim 
that a relationship was established between Tibet and Han China during this period.46 
Western historians value impartiality, however there is a tendency in the Western 
historiography to support the Tibetan viewpoint. This is due to the attraction of the 
mystical image of Tibet propagated in Western literature and the desire to 
counterbalance what is regarded as an aggressive Chinese viewpoint.47 
                                                          
42 Jing W., 100 Questions About Tibet, Beijing, Beijing Review Press, 1989, pp. 4-6. 
43 L.R. Sullivan, ‘The Controversy over “Feudal Despotism”: Politics and Historiography in 
China, 1978-82’, J. Unger (ed.), Using the Past to Serve the Present: Historiography and 
Politics in Contemporary China, London, M. E. Sharpe, 1993, p. 191. 
44 Richardson, Tibet and Its History, p. 34. 
45 E. Sperling, ‘The Yuan Dynasty (1279-1368)’, in A. Blondeau and K. Buffetrille (ed.), 
Authenticating Tibet: Answers to China’s 100 Questions, Los Angeles, University of California 
Press, 2008, pp. 14-15. 
46 Smith Jr., Tibetan Nation, p. 97. 
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The Ming Dynasty overthrew the Yuan Dynasty in 1368 and began a period of 
ethnic Han Chinese rule in China. Religion remains the basis of the discussion of 
Tibetan independence from China during the Ming period. Tibetan historians maintain 
that when Mongol authority ceased, Tibet regained its independence.48 Chinese 
historians argue that the Ming Dynasty inherited rule over Tibet from the Yuan 
Dynasty, although the Chinese historians Liu and Shen admit that the Ming Emperors 
did not exercise the same level of political control over Tibet as had been present under 
the Yuan Dynasty.49 Many Western historians argue that while the Ming Dynasty did 
maintain aspects of Tibetan governance on paper, and through superficial measures such 
as confirming titles of religious leaders, this did not mark any real authority or influence 
over Tibet.50 The Tibetan-Mongol relationship was maintained even after the fall of the 
Yuan Dynasty. In 1642, Gusri Khan invaded Tibet and established the fifth Dalai Lama 
of the Gelugpa Sect as supreme religious and temporal leader of Tibet. This is of both 
political and religious importance to Tibetan history. Both Tibetan and Western 
historians argue that the establishment of the Dalai Lama as ruler of Tibet was brought 
about by Mongol power exhibited through the ongoing priest-patron relationship.51 
Tibetan historians argue that the fifth Dalai Lama established diplomatic relations with 
the Chinese after assuming power in Tibet, portraying Tibet and China as equal states.52 
However Chinese sources focus instead on the fact that the Dalai Lama and other 
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religious leaders were allowed to pay tribute to the Ming Emperors.53 Yannian Dai et al. 
justifies the Chinese position by stating that from the time of the fifth Dalai Lama, it has 
been the practice for all Dalai Lamas to have their titles conferred on them by the 
central Chinese government.54 In addition, some Chinese sources argue that successive 
Chinese governments have patronised Buddhism to strategically control the Tibetan 
people.55 Li states that the Yuan government ‘found the warlike Tibetans a difficult 
people to rule, and resolved to reduce them to a condition of docility through the 
influence of religion’.56 This stance on religion shows the influence of Marxist thought 
on Chinese historiography, as Marxism views religion as a form of social control which 
would be abandoned once the masses were educated and exposed to scientific thought.57  
Chinese and Tibetan historians both seek to portray the creation of the position 
of Dalai Lama in a strategic light. By arguing that the Dalai Lama is subject to the 
Chinese government, Chinese historians claim the most powerful symbol of Tibet as 
subordinate to Chinese authority. Tibetan historians attempt to distance the 
establishment of the Dalai Lama from Chinese history in order to build on the image of 
Tibetan uniqueness. This demonstrates the influence of the West on the Sino-Tibetan 
debate. The Dalai Lama has become a powerful symbol of Tibet in Western thought 
during the twentieth century. Since the fourteenth Dalai Lama’s exile from Tibet in 
1959, he has come to personify the image of Tibet in the West.58 For this reason, and in 
order to garner support from the West, both Chinese and Tibetan historians construct 
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their interpretation of the origin of the Dalai Lama’s legitimacy and power in a way 
which associates the position with either China or Tibet. Anand refers to this as a 
‘strategy of internationalization’.59 Tibetan historians have been particularly successful 
in equating Buddhism with Tibetan identity. The majority of Western historians support 
the Tibetan viewpoint on this issue, demonstrating the influence of the romanticisation 
of Tibetan religion on Western historical thought.  
Themes of independence, subordination and mutual influence have been debated 
in Chinese, Tibetan and Western historiography of the Sino-Tibetan relationship during 
the Tang, Yuan and Ming Dynasties. Key events and ideas, such as the nature of the 
Mongol-Tibetan priest-patron relationship and the importance of religion and culture, 
have become focal points for historiographical debate. Tibetan historiography of these 
periods has been affected by postcolonial and nationalist historiography which stress the 
strength and uniqueness of Tibetan identity and culture. Chinese historians have been 
influenced by a juxtaposition of traditional Chinese thought and Chinese Marxism. In 
addition, Chinese historians make claims of involvement in establishing the origins of 
Buddhism and the Dalai Lama in Tibet, as a way of claiming China’s influence on a 
unique aspect of Tibetan culture and historically linking Tibet to China. The influence 
of the romanticisation of Tibet in Western thought often draws Western historians to 
support the Tibetan viewpoint. The historiographical debates discussed in this chapter 
are used by Chinese and Tibetan historians to prove the longevity of their interpretation 
of the Sino-Tibetan relationship. For Chinese historians who wish to legitimise the 
1950-1951 occupation of Tibet, these periods of history are used to prove that Tibet has 
always been under Chinese influence. For historians who argue for modern Tibetan 
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independence, the historiography proves that while Tibet has had a long relationship 
with China, it has historically been an independent state. This debate continues to be 
exhibited in the historiography of the Sino-Tibetan relationship during the Qing 
Dynasty. 
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Qing Dynasty 
During the period of the Qing Dynasty, from 1644 to 1911, Chinese authority over 
Tibet strengthened. The debate concerning whether Tibet was independent or 
subordinate during this time continues in the historiography. Key themes in the 
historiography of the Qing Dynasty include the extent of Qing power and governance in 
Tibet, as well as the impact of the introduction of British imperialism to the region. 
Qing military aid to Tibet provided China with a foothold to strengthen their presence in 
Tibet and enact reforms concerning the governance of Tibet. British imperialism also 
affected the Sino-Tibetan relationship, particularly through the signing of international 
conventions. The discussion of the role of religion in the Sino-Tibetan relationship is 
also carried through from the historiography of earlier dynasties. The source of the 
Dalai Lama’s power in Tibet is also strongly debated by Tibetan and Chinese historians 
since the origin of this powerful symbol of Buddhism and temporal authority provides a 
key source of legitimacy for Tibetan independence. 
A key theme in the historiography is increasing Chinese control over Tibet 
during the Qing Dynasty and how this relates to whether Tibet is regarded in current 
debate as independent from or subordinate to China. One way in which the Qing 
increased their presence in Tibet was through military aid. Several times throughout 
their rule, the Qing government sent troops to support Tibet against foreign invasion. 
While this military aid was sent at the request of Tibetans, historians debate whether the 
Qing government took advantage of their subsequent position in Tibet to enact reforms 
and tighten control over Tibet. The Qing government sent troops to Tibet in 1717 in 
response to a Tibetan request for help against an invasion by Dzungar Mongols, and 
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again in 1791 in response to a Gurkha invasion.60 Li states that these military excursions 
enabled the Qing government to increase its control over Tibet and that it not only 
exercised sovereignty over Tibet but actively ruled through the new Lhasa government, 
which it established in 1720.61 While Tibetan historians agree that the military aid was 
requested, Free Tibet argues that the Qing government took advantage of Tibetan 
instability following the Dzungar invasion to take control of Tibet.62 This suggests that 
Tibet saw itself as an independent state requesting help from its ally, while Chinese 
historians often view this military aid as a legitimate means by which China came to 
exercise sovereignty over Tibet.63 In order to stress Tibetan autonomy, several Tibetan 
historians downplay the role of the Qing troops in driving out the Dzungars. Shakabpa 
states that the Dzungars were already ‘on the run from Lhasa’ before the arrival of 
imperial troops.64 The Central Tibetan Administration also argues that although the 
military expeditions allowed the Qing to exert some authority over Tibet in the 
aftermath of crisis, this influence did not last.65 Western historians differ in the degree 
to which they argue that Qing influence was exerted following military expeditions into 
Tibet. Goldstein argues that although the Qing Emperor did want to control the Tibetan 
leadership, he was not actually interested in absorbing Tibet into China.66 This 
demonstrates a lesser degree of presentism in Western historiography. While Tibetan 
and Chinese historians are often highly presentist, analysing historical events in the 
context of the modern Sino-Tibetan relationship, Goldstein attempts to explain what the 
aims of the Qing Emperor may have been without being influenced by an attempt to 
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justify Tibet’s current status. Goldstein describes the Sino-Tibetan relationship during 
the Qing Dynasty as one of ‘passive hegemony’, with the Qing protecting Tibet in 
exchange for Tibetan rulers acting in Qing dynastic interests.67 However Chinese 
historians argue that Qing control was far more substantive than the term ‘passive 
hegemony’ suggests, with the presence of Chinese troops in Tibet allowing the Qing to 
enact reforms in the governance of Tibet. 
From 1720 onwards there was a permanent Chinese presence in Tibet, however 
the degree to which the Qing Dynasty exerted either real or symbolic authority is 
debated by historians. Smith argues that although the Qing did exert control, they 
differentiated Inner Asia from China in terms of administration,68 and despite claims by 
contemporary Chinese historians, Tibet ‘did not thereby become a part of China. Tibet 
remained a distinct nation’.69 Formal Chinese influence in Tibet did increase during the 
Qing Dynasty. Following the expulsion of the Dzungar Mongols in 1720, the Qing 
established a Tibetan government which included the office of Amban, a high official 
who represented the Qing Dynasty in Tibet. Chinese historians argue that this proves 
the strength of Qing administration over Tibet, however Tibetans argue that the 
administration of Tibet actually remained in the hands of the Tibetans, and that the 
Amban did not exercise real authority.70 The Qing Dynasty also enacted reforms in 1793 
under the ‘29 Article Regulations Concerning the Administration of Tibet’. Key points 
of the reforms were that the Ambans were raised to a status equal to the Dalai Lama and 
held authority over Tibet’s foreign affairs. The reincarnation of the Dalai Lama and the 
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highest Tibetan officials had to be confirmed by the Qing government and Tibetan 
troops were put under the command of the Qing.71 Zhong states that these reforms 
governed Tibet’s administration for over 100 years.72 While Western historians 
generally agree that these reforms marked the high point of Qing authority in Tibet, they 
argue that this influence declined throughout the nineteenth century.73 Chayet considers 
that these reforms were not fully successful as the Qing government was often unable to 
enforce them because of its declining power.74 The Central Tibetan Administration also 
argues that the regulations were only suggestions, which the Tibetan government could 
choose whether or not to adopt.75 Several Chinese historians agree that Qing power 
declined in the nineteenth century, blaming this weakening of the Qing state on the 
influence of British imperialism in China and Tibet.76 
A key theme in the historiography of the Qing Dynasty is the influence which 
British imperialism had on the Sino-Tibetan relationship. The way in which imperial 
Britain interacted with China and Tibet in the nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries 
has influenced perceptions of the status of Tibet by Tibetan, Chinese and Western 
historians. The influence of Marxist thought on Chinese historiography has contributed 
to their criticism of British imperialism. Marxism holds that imperialism is a function of 
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capitalism at its highest form, which primarily benefits the state and the bourgeoisie.77 
Many Chinese historians hold the view that Britain was conspiring to disrupt China’s 
unity with Tibet by promoting Tibetan independence.78 However Liu and Shen are also 
critical of the Qing government’s response to British imperialism, stating that China 
failed to protect Tibet.79 Suo and Wang agree that China’s ‘capitulationist policy’ was 
to blame for British interference in Tibet.80 Tibetan historians are more forgiving of 
British imperialism because they are able to use British interactions with Tibet to 
demonstrate that Tibet was operating as an autonomous state. The fourteenth Dalai 
Lama writes that by signing the 1904 Lhasa Convention with Britain, Tibet ‘had made a 
formal international agreement as a sovereign power’.81 This is a highly presentist 
interpretation which analyses Anglo-Tibetan interactions in the light of modern Tibet’s 
desire for independence. Western historians’ analysis of imperialist actions tends to 
accept less critically the history of Western imperial dominance in both China and 
Tibet. For example, Grunfeld, Goldstein and Smith all describe events brought about by 
British imperialism with little attempt to analyse the impact on Sino-Tibetan relations 
other than to discuss the shift from Chinese sovereignty to suzerainty.82  
The events which are most commonly discussed in order to highlight the impact 
of imperialism on the status of Sino-Tibetan relations are the 1904 and 1906 Lhasa 
Conventions resulting from the Younghusband Expedition. In 1903 the British launched 
an expedition into Tibet headed by Colonel Francis Younghusband, which Jing refers to 
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as ‘a full-scale military invasion of Tibet’.83 Free Tibet also calls the mission a 
‘temporary invasion’ while Western sources refer to it only as a ‘mission’ or 
‘expedition’.84 The expedition faced military resistance from Tibetans on a number of 
occasions, when the poorly armed Tibetans were easily defeated by British weapons.85 
The British pressed through to Lhasa to find that the Dalai Lama had fled and so 
negotiated the ensuing 1904 Lhasa Convention with Tibetan representatives. The main 
purpose of the treaty was to grant trading rights to the British in Tibet. However the 
treaty also included a clause restricting Tibet’s ability to negotiate with any foreign 
powers. Grunfeld argues that this amounted to Tibet becoming a protectorate of the 
British Empire.86 This also posed a threat to what China regarded as its sovereignty in 
Tibet, because it was unclear whether Britain meant to use this clause to exclude China 
from negotiating with Tibet. While the Qing Amban was consulted on the signing of the 
Convention, on orders from Beijing he did not actually sign it.87 Some modern Chinese 
historians state that the lack of Chinese signature meant that the treaty was not legally 
effective.88 However Liu and Shen state that the Ambans did not sign because they had 
no real power to control the Tibetans or prevent the negotiations.89 Tibetan historians 
use the Lhasa Convention as proof that Tibet was operating as a sovereign power by 
negotiating international agreements on its own terms.90 This causes some Tibetan 
historians to appear supportive of British imperialism, a position which may not reflect 
the opinion of contemporary Tibetans. Following the signing of the 1904 Convention, 
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Britain and China continued to negotiate and signed the Anglo-Chinese Convention in 
1906 which ratified the 1904 Lhasa Convention. It also agreed that Britain would not 
interfere in Tibetan politics if China prevented other foreign powers from interfering. 
Chinese historians see the 1906 Convention as a British acknowledgement of Chinese 
sovereignty over Tibet.91 However the fourteenth Dalai Lama writes that by signing the 
1906 Convention and ratifying the 1904 Lhasa Convention, China was accepting that 
Chinese power in Tibet had ended.92 Western sources state that the 1906 Convention 
recognised Chinese suzerainty, a weaker term than sovereignty, indicating that Tibet 
would retain internal autonomy. Smith states that the Tibetans could have argued for 
independence based on the 1904 Convention, however the 1906 Convention ‘relegated 
Tibetan affairs once again to a concern of China’.93 
The importance of religion to historical debate concerning the Sino-Tibetan 
relationship is continued in the historiography regarding the Qing Dynasty. Religion is 
important to the discussion of the status of Tibet because it is a symbol of the unique 
Tibetan identity, which differentiates it from China and emphasises Tibetan 
independence. Chinese historians attempt to portray Chinese Emperors as the creators 
of Buddhism’s important status in Tibet as a way of historically linking Tibet to China. 
Jing states that:  
To better manage Tibet, the Qing Dynasty’s central government ordered 
the seventh Dalai Lama to take charge of the region’s administration in 
1751. It is evident, therefore, that both the title and the political and 
religious powers of Dalai Lama were granted by China’s central 
government.94  
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As previously discussed, Marxist thought opposes religion, believing it to be a form of 
mind control for the masses.95 This is reflected in the Chinese historiography, with 
Chinese historians often mentioning that the Qing Dynasty only used Buddhism as a 
political tool to control the Tibetans and prevent them from becoming militant.96 
However Marxist thought also states that time should be allowed to educate the masses, 
and under this consideration, the Chinese Communist Party allows religious freedom.97 
In this way, China reconciles the need in Chinese historiography to claim ownership of 
Buddhism and the Dalai Lama in order to legitimise their rule in Tibet, and the 
opposition to religion which stems from Marxist thought.  
The 1793 reforms established regulations that the reincarnation of the Dalai 
Lama and Panchen Lama should be approved by the Qing Emperor. The China 
Embassy website states that this practice officially established the political and religious 
status of the Dalai Lama and Panchen Lama in Tibet.98 However, Tibetan historians 
argue that the establishment of the temporal and spiritual power of the Dalai Lama had 
existed since the time of the fifth Dalai Lama, who claimed his power not through the 
Qing government but with the help of the Mongol, Gusri Khan.99 As previously 
discussed, Western historians tend to agree with Tibetan historians on the source of the 
Dalai Lama’s legitimacy and power. There is a fascination with Tibetan Buddhism in 
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the West and the more the Chinese try to appropriate the origins of Buddhism, the more 
the West clings to a mythologised image of Tibet.100 The visit of the Dalai Lama to 
Beijing in 1653 has also been the subject of current debate concerning the role of 
religion in determining the nature of the relationship between China and Tibet. Li 
voices the opinion of many Chinese historians when he states that the visit was an act of 
submission by the Dalai Lama to the Qing Emperor.101 However the Emperor journeyed 
outside of the capital to meet the Dalai Lama, which Tibetan historians argue proves 
that the two leaders were meeting as equals.102 Western historians are more divided in 
their interpretation of the event. Grunfeld states that it is unclear how contemporary 
Tibetans and Chinese regarded their relationship, while Goldstein states firmly that the 
meeting did not indicate political subordination by the Tibetans.103  
The historiography concerning the Sino-Tibetan relationship during the Qing 
Dynasty displays similar themes to that of the Tang, Yuan and Ming Dynasties. The 
question of whether Tibet was independent from or subordinate to China continues to be 
debated through the representation of key events such as the 1793 reforms in Tibet and 
the signing of the 1904 Lhasa Convention. A new theme which emerges in the 
historiography of the Qing Dynasty is the impact of British imperialism. While Britain 
was simply acting in its own imperial interests, the manner in which it interacted with 
both China and Tibet in relation to trade has been used by Chinese and Tibetan 
historians to debate Tibet’s status. The role of Buddhism in Tibetan identity continues 
to be a key theme in the historiography because of its importance to international 
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perceptions of Tibet today. The historiography of the Qing Dynasty is important to 
modern debate about the status of Tibet, because this period marked a high point of 
Chinese authority in Tibet. While historians debate the degree to which Tibet 
maintained a level of autonomy, the Qing Dynasty did exercise authority over the 
governance of Tibet through the position of Amban and the enacting of administrative 
reforms. This Chinese authority was to be significantly affected by the fall of the Qing 
Dynasty in the 1911 Chinese Revolution.  
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Republic of China 
In 1911, the Qing Dynasty was overthrown in the Chinese Revolution and the Republic 
of China was established. This had massive implications for the nature of the Sino-
Tibetan relationship. Many Tibetans regarded Tibet as having been subordinate to the 
Qing Dynasty, rather than to Han China, and that following the Revolution, Tibet was 
able to reassert its independence. The historiography dealing with the period from 1911 
to 1949 is characterised by greater agreement between historians. Due to the greater 
availability of primary sources, the sequence of events during this period is less 
disputed. However the interpretation of these events in the historiography is politically 
nuanced, focusing on issues such as what constitutes a declaration of independence and 
by which actions a country is deemed independent. While the interpretations of Western 
and Tibetan historians are influenced by an ideology of nationalism, China’s claim to 
sovereignty over Tibet is founded on the right of imperial conquest. Ethnocentric 
nationalism has had a strong influence on Tibetan historians, who foreground the 
agency of the Tibetans in their dealings with China and imperial Britain. However 
Tibetan historians often fall into a nostalgia for traditional Tibetan society. While 
several Western historians argue that Tibet was independent during the Republic, they 
have often romanticised Tibet and essentialised it as a naïve nation. Chinese historians 
have been influenced by Marxism in their scepticism of Western imperialism, but 
remained adamant in their atavistic claims that Tibet is an integral part of China.  
Tibetan and Western historiography of the republican period has been influenced 
by Tibetan ethnocentric nationalism. Following the Chinese Revolution in 1911, Yuan 
Shi-kai issued a statement that he was restoring the thirteenth Dalai Lama’s titles. 
However the Dalai Lama made the reply that he was not seeking confirmation from the 
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Chinese government, as he intended to exercise spiritual and temporal authority in 
Tibet.104 The Dalai Lama issued a proclamation in 1913 which outlined the history of 
the Sino-Tibetan relationship in terms of the priest-patron model in order to prove 
Tibet’s independence from China.105 Tibetan historians consider that these two actions 
by the Dalai Lama amounted to a Tibetan declaration of independence.106 Tibetan 
historians have been influenced by an ethnocentric nationalism to regard Tibet’s right to 
independence in 1911 as a result of their separate national identity from China.107 Many 
Western historians support Tibet’s claim to independence, however do not as readily 
accept that the Dalai Lama’s actions constituted a declaration of independence. Shakya 
and Blondeau state that despite it being clear to Tibetans that the Dalai Lama was 
proclaiming independence, Tibet’s lack of understanding of the global political climate 
meant that they failed to achieve international recognition of their status as an 
independent nation.108 The hegemony of Western ideas in the modern political climate 
has influenced the arguments of both Tibetan and Chinese historians, who have been 
forced to make their arguments regarding the status of Tibet within this framework. For 
Western historians, it is important that Tibet achieved international recognition in order 
to become truly independent. However, as discussed in the introduction, Tibet had never 
previously considered the need to formally proclaim its independence from China, 
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because its traditional relations with its neighbours were based on ‘mutually inclusive 
and overlapping territorial jurisdiction’.109 
The majority of Chinese historians believe that China’s weakness during the 
period of the Republic of China was to blame for the high level of Tibetan autonomy 
during this time, but that China has always retained its claim to Tibet.110 In 1912, 
despite China’s lack of actual authority in Tibet, Yuan Shi-kai issued a statement that 
the Republic of China was a unified country composed of the five ethnicities of Han, 
Manchu, Mongolian, Hui and Tibetan.111 Smith argues that although Tibet under the 
thirteenth Dalai Lama ‘achieved an unprecedented degree of national unity’,112 the 
Chinese were not influenced by the same ideal of nationalism as Tibetan and Western 
historians. For them, China’s claims to Tibet were ‘based upon imperialist rights of 
conquest’.113 Only Liu and Shen agree with Tibetan historians that the Dalai Lama’s 
actions were a declaration of independence and that from 1911 to 1949, ‘Lhasa [had] to 
all practical purposes enjoyed full independence’.114  
The influence of postcolonial thought on Tibetan, Chinese and Western 
historians is clearly seen in their interpretation of the influence of British imperialism on 
the status of Tibet. As discussed in the previous chapter, Tibet had come under the 
sphere of influence of the British Government of India during the Qing Dynasty, and 
was concurrently asserting its independence from both British and Chinese imperialism 
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in 1911. Tibetan historians write their history by foregrounding the agency of the 
Tibetans. In 1914, the Simla Conference was convened between Britain, China and 
Tibet in an attempt to settle issues concerning the status of Tibet. Shakabpa writes that 
Tibet ‘[pressed] the British into arranging a tripartite conference’,115 giving the 
impression that the Tibetans were the driving force behind the decision to enter into 
discussions with China and Britain. Tibetan historians also stress the autonomy of the 
Tibetan representatives at Simla, who negotiated on equal terms with the Chinese and 
British plenipotentiaries.116 Tibetan historians argue that by participating in the 
conference, China was accepting the equal status of the Tibetan representative and the 
power of Tibet to sign international agreements, which they argue are both signs of an 
independent nation.117 China refused to sign the final Simla Convention, however it was 
signed by Tibet and Britain, which Tibetan historians maintain indicates both that China 
relinquished their claim to sovereignty and that Tibet was operating as an independent 
nation by concluding international treaties.118  
Chinese and Western historians both argue that the British were the drivers 
behind the Simla Convention. The consensus among Chinese historians is that the 
British took advantage of the chaos of revolution in China to exert their influence in 
Tibet and convince the Tibetans to separate from China.119 They also state that China 
was forced to attend the Simla Conference because Britain threatened to withhold 
recognition of the new Republic of China and to sign a direct Anglo-Tibetan treaty 
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without consulting China.120 The Chinese anti-imperialist perspective is consistent with 
Marxist thought.121 Li agrees that the equal status of the Tibetan representative was 
insisted upon by the British, not at the behest of the Tibetans themselves, which 
counters Tibetan claims of agency.122 However, Li concedes that the presence of a 
Tibetan plenipotentiary at Simla did signal a change in the status of Tibet. 123 Chinese 
historians argue that the Simla Convention is illegal and void because it was not signed 
by the Chinese government.124  
Western historians are caught between a desire to counteract Chinese 
historiography which displays a complete lack of agency for Tibetans, and a romantic 
belief in the naivety of the Tibetans. Shakya and Blondeau argue for Tibetan agency, 
stating that Tibet organised the Simla conference with Britain.125 However Grunfeld and 
Smith are more sceptical about the extent to which Tibet was able to exercise agency 
when dealing with Britain. Grunfeld argues that the Simla Convention could indicate a 
lack of independence because Tibet was unable to oppose the clauses which forced it to 
give up territory and admit to Chinese suzerainty.126 Smith also argues that the 
Convention was a failure because it did not guarantee Tibetan security and was 
beneficial only to the British.127 Smith and Grunfeld, writing in the 1990s, are more 
sceptical of Tibetan agency and less supportive of modern Tibetan political goals than 
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recent Western historiography, such as Blondeau and Buffetrille’s 2008 work. This 
suggests that Western historiography is becoming more pro-Tibetan over time because 
of the increased attention and politicisation regarding Tibetan nationalism. Many 
Westerners are influenced by the romanticisation of Tibet and feelings of paternalism. 
As discussed in the introduction, the infantilisation of Tibet is a construction in Western 
thought which represents Tibetans as a naïve people who are reliant on assistance from 
the Western world in order to achieve their independence. 
Although whether Tibet achieved full independence during the period of the 
Republic of China remains disputed, it is generally agreed in the historiography that 
Tibet operated with autonomy during this time. The thirteenth Dalai Lama ruled Tibet 
until his death in 1933, during which time he enacted a number of reforms in an attempt 
to modernise Tibet. Tibetan attitudes towards his governance are complex. The Dalai 
Lama was aware that Tibet would need to modernise to survive and enacted a number 
of reforms to prevent corruption and decrease inequality.128 However the influence of 
postcolonialism on Tibetan historiography has aroused a sense of nostalgia for Tibet’s 
past before the modernisation and introduction of western technology. Many 
conservative Tibetans oppose modernising reforms because they cling to the traditional 
Tibetan lifestyle.129 Norbu’s and Turnbull’s work exhibits a strong postcolonial 
influence in its blend of fact and legend, with a stated aim of presenting Tibet ‘not with 
fictions of a romantic Western imagination, but with the reality of the thoughts and 
beliefs of the Tibetan people themselves’.130 Norbu avoids nostalgia and admits that 
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Tibet needed reforms. He argues that Tibetans admire the traditional form of 
government because the acceptance of the absolute rule of the Dalai Lama is an act of 
faith by Tibetans, which cannot be understood by a modern, Western conception of 
politics.131 Western historians are similarly conflicted. Western thought regards Tibet as 
a traditional place, which it is necessary to improve by introducing Western forms of 
modernisation.132 This detracts from the agency and identity that Tibetans can find in 
their traditional society. However Westerners also romanticise traditional Tibetan 
society and resist the idea of a modern Tibet. Tibet’s geographic and cultural isolation 
have allowed it to be constructed in the Western imagination as suspended in time and 
as a counterbalance to rational Western society. This causes some unease in Western 
thought at the idea of modernisation in Tibet.133 Chinese sources do not extensively 
discuss the governance and reforms of the thirteenth Dalai Lama but instead focus on 
portraying the negative aspects of Tibetan feudalism in order to justify Chinese 
interference. Zhang describes the Tibetan system of government as having a ‘decadent, 
dark and cruel nature [which] hampered social progress, and slowed down the 
development of productive forces’.134 
The historiography relating to Tibet during the period of the Republic of China 
is far more political in nature than the historiography concerning earlier dynasties. 
However the importance of religion remains central to the historiography. Religion has 
been intricately linked with politics in Tibet since the fifth Dalai Lama was established 
as both political and religious leader of Tibet. The thirteenth Dalai Lama died in 1933 
which prompted a search for his reincarnation. Historians debate whether the Chinese 
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government was involved in the selection and appointment of the fourteenth Dalai 
Lama or whether Tibet acted autonomously. Tibetan historians argue that approval of 
the reincarnate boy was not sought from the Chinese government because he was 
selected according to Tibetan tradition.135 A Chinese delegation arrived in Lhasa for the 
enthronement ceremony, which Tibetan historians interpret as a carefully timed ploy by 
the Chinese to claim a role of legitimisation in the ceremony.136 Chinese historians state 
that the Tibetan authorities informed the Chinese government that the incarnation had 
been found and that Chiang Kai-shek issued a decree conferring the title of Dalai Lama 
upon the boy.137 Grunfeld agrees that the Tibetan government requested a representative 
of the Chinese government to officiate at the golden urn ceremony but that by the time 
they arrived in Lhasa, the reincarnation had already been chosen.138 Smith argues that 
the invitation was sent but was understood differently by the Tibetans, who saw it as an 
invitation to attend the ceremony, and the Chinese, who took it as a request to 
officiate.139 The varying interpretations of the selection of the fourteenth Dalai Lama 
demonstrate the highly contentious nature of even relatively modern events in Sino-
Tibetan history. Although all historians agree on who was present for the selection 
ceremony, they debate the motivations and significance of these events.  
The historiography of the Republic of China has been characterised by a greater 
degree of political interpretation than the historiography of previous dynasties. The 
issue of whether Tibet was independent between 1911 and 1949 is interpreted by 
historians within a framework of modern Western political concepts. Tibetan and 
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Chinese historians have been forced to frame their arguments within this context, 
despite it being a foreign imposition on traditional Chinese and Tibetan political 
thought. This demonstrates the influence which Western thought has had on the 
historiography, as Tibetan and Chinese historians construct their interpretations using 
political language that appeals to a Western audience. The modernity of Tibet is also a 
strong influence on the historiography of this period. While most historians recognise 
the need for Tibet to survive, Tibetan historians are influenced by a postcolonial 
nostalgia for a traditional past. In addition, Western historians have been influenced by 
the infantilisation of Tibet to view the modernisation of Tibet as a paternal 
responsibility of the West. However the stereotyping of Tibet as a traditional and 
isolated place has caused a sense of unease amongst Westerners confronted by Tibetan 
modernisation.  
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Conclusion 
In 1950, the Chinese People’s Liberation Army advanced on Tibet in what many 
Chinese historians refer to as a liberation of Tibet from foreign imperial aggression. 
Tibetan historians argue that the events of 1950-1951 were in fact an invasion of Tibet 
by China. While Western historians attempt to balance these two opposing 
interpretations, the majority tend to come down in favour of the Tibetan interpretation. 
In 1951, the signing of the Seventeen Point Agreement, which definitively stated that 
Tibet was a region of China, marked the first time in the history of the Sino-Tibetan 
relationship that Tibet was formally subsumed into Han China. This event has become a 
touchstone for debate of earlier Sino-Tibetan historiography, which interprets the status 
of Tibet throughout history with the aim of either legitimising or refuting China’s 1951 
claim to Tibet.  
Chinese historians have been influenced in their interpretation by a mixture of 
traditional Chinese thought, Marxism and Western political thought. The fundamental 
belief that Tibet is an integral part of China is an argument in Chinese historiography 
which owes its origins to medieval Chinese thought, which saw China as a superior 
civilisation which neighbouring states felt drawn towards. This argument has been 
augmented by Marxist thought, which opposes the British imperialism which China 
sees as responsible for its fading influence in Tibet during the late-nineteenth and early-
twentieth centuries. Despite an opposition to Western imperialism, Chinese 
historiography has also been influenced by Western political thought. Due to the 
hegemony of Western ideas in the modern political climate, Chinese historians structure 
their arguments for Chinese authority in Tibet around the concept of sovereignty, which 
is foreign to traditional Chinese political thought.   
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Tibetan historians are influenced in their interpretation of history by modern 
Tibetan nationalism. This is formulated around the idea that Tibet’s historically unique 
ethnicity and culture distinguishes it from China. Tibetan historians emphasise this by 
foregrounding the agency of Tibetans in their relationship with China and arguing that 
Tibet has always operated autonomously throughout history. In doing so, Tibetan 
historiography also focuses on the significance of Buddhism to Tibetan identity. The 
image of Tibet in the West has also influenced Tibetan historiography. Many Tibetan 
historians have appropriated Western essentialised constructions of Tibet as naïve, 
isolated and peaceful in order to gather support from the West. The use of this 
romanticised notion of Tibet is a form of agency in itself. By purposefully responding to 
the image of Tibet in the West, Tibetan historians are using history to gain political 
support for modern Tibetan nationalism.  
Western historians often consider themselves to be writing Sino-Tibetan history 
from the outside. However Western ideas have had a strong influence on Sino-Tibetan 
historiography and as such, Western historiography is implicated in the debate which it 
attempts to resolve. Western historians are mainly influenced by the romanticisation of 
Tibet in Western thought. This has included the infantilisation and essentialisation of 
Tibet, to stereotype it as an isolated, peaceful and traditional place which has been 
suspended in time. This has caused Western historians to construct Tibetan culture as an 
antidote to Western modernity, which has been violated by Chinese aggression. For this 
reason, most Western historians support the Tibetan historical viewpoint.  
This dissertation has shown the contentious nature of Sino-Tibetan 
historiography. A number of events during the Tang, Yuan, Ming and Qing Dynasties, 
and during the Republic of China, have been debated by historians to argue either for or 
against Tibetan independence. Sino-Tibetan history has become highly politicised due 
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to the ongoing debate surrounding the status of modern Tibet. While this dissertation 
has used the 1950-1951 occupation of Tibet as a foundation for its examination of Sino-
Tibetan historiography, ongoing attention should be paid to events in Tibet since the 
1950s. The status of Tibet is one which will continue to be debated by historians in the 
future. The way in which the history of China and Tibet has been written is an example 
of how current political situations can influence historiography, and how different 
interpretations of the same historical events can result in widely different versions of the 
truth. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
46 
 
Bibliography 
Primary Sources: 
Chinese: 
China Tibet Online, ‘Ming Dynasty (1368-1644)’, 2011, 
http://eng.tibet.cn/2010ls/m/201101/t20110121_869375.html, (accessed 25 April 2015). 
China Tibet Online, ‘Peaceful Liberation of Tibet’, 2011, 
http://eng.tibet.cn/2010ls/xxhpjf/201101/t20110121_869402.html, (accessed 9 June 
2015). 
China Tibet Online, ‘Qing Dynasty (1644-1911)’, 2011, 
http://eng.tibet.cn/2010ls/q/201101/t20110121_869398.html, (accessed 25 April 2015). 
China Tibet Online, ‘Republic of China (1911-1949)’, 2011, 
http://eng.tibet.cn/2010ls/m/201101/t20110121_869375.html, (accessed 9 June 2015). 
Jing W., 100 Questions About Tibet, Beijing, Beijing Review Press, 1989. 
Li T.T., The Historical Status of Tibet, New York, King’s Crown Press, 1956. 
Liu S.C. and Shen T.L., Tibet and the Tibetans, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 
1953. 
Lobsang and Yun, J., ‘History and Anecdotes’, in Dai Y. et al., (ed.), Tibet: Myth vs 
Reality, Beijing, Beijing Review, 1988, pp. 16-35. 
Suo W. and Wang F., Highlights of Tibetan History, Beijing, New World Press, 1984. 
47 
 
The Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in New Zealand, ‘The Consistent Stand 
Taken by the Successive Chinese Central Governments towards the Sovereignty over 
Tibet after the Revolution of 1911,’ 
http://www.chinaembassy.org.nz/eng/zt/zgxz/xzfz/t39515.htm, (accessed 9 June 2015). 
The Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in New Zealand, ‘The History of 
Tibet’, http://www.chinaembassy.org.nz/eng/zt/zgxz/xzgk/t39474.htm, (accessed 10 
June 2015). 
Zhong Z., China’s Tibet, Beijing, China Intercontinental Press, 2001. 
Tibetan: 
Central Tibetan Administration, ‘Tibet: Proving Truth From Facts’, 2006, 
http://tibet.net/1996/01/tibet-proving-truth-from-facts-1996/, (accessed 19 June 2015). 
Free Tibet, ‘Is Tibet a Country?’, http://freetibet.org/about/legal-status-tibet, (accessed 
19 June, 2015). 
Free Tibet, ‘Tibet’s History’ http://freetibet.org/about/tibets-history#Timelinepre1900, 
(accessed 17 June 2015). 
Free Tibet, ‘What Is China’s Argument on Tibet?’, http://freetibet.org/about/china-
argument-tibet, (accessed 17 June 2015). 
Gyatso, T., Freedom in Exile: The Autobiography of the Dalai Lama, David Howarth 
(ed.), London, Hodder and Stoughton, 1990. 
Gyatso, T., My Land and My People: The Autobiography of His Holiness the Dalai 
Lama, London, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1962. 
48 
 
Norbu, T.J. and Turnbull, C., Tibet: Its History, Religion and People, Harmondsworth, 
Penguin Books, 1972. 
Shakabpa, T.W.D., Tibet: A Political History, New York, Potala Publications, 1984. 
Shakya, T., The Dragon in the Land of Snows: A History of Modern Tibet Since 1947, 
London, Pimlico, 1999. 
Western: 
Chayet, A., ‘The Qing Dynasty (1644-1911)’, in A. Blondeau and K. Buffetrille (ed.), 
Authenticating Tibet: Answers to China’s 100 Questions, Los Angeles, University of 
California Press, 2008, pp. 21-33. 
Goldstein, M.C., The Snow Lion and the Dragon: China, Tibet, and the Dalai Lama, 
Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1997. 
Grunfeld, T.A., The Making of Modern Tibet, New York, M. E. Sharpe, 1996. 
Karmay, S.,‘Under what circumstances did the PLA decide to march into Tibet?’, in A. 
Blondeau and K. Buffetrille (ed.), Authenticating Tibet: Answers to China’s 100 
Questions, Los Angeles, University of California Press, 2008, pp. 55-64. 
Richardson, H.E., Tibet and its History, London, Oxford University Press, 1962. 
Shakya, T. and Blondeau, A., ‘How did Britain and the United States interfere with 
China’s domestic affairs with regard to Tibet in the past?’, in A. Blondeau and K. 
Buffetrille (ed.), Authenticating Tibet: Answers to China’s 100 Questions, Los Angeles, 
University of California Press, 2008, pp. 45-50. 
Shakya, T. and Blondeau, A., ‘Why was the issue of “Tibetan independence” raised 
early in this century?’, in A. Blondeau and K. Buffetrille (ed.), Authenticating Tibet: 
49 
 
Answers to China’s 100 Questions, Los Angeles, University of California Press, 2008, 
pp. 39-44. 
Smith Jr., W.W., Tibetan Nation: A History of Tibetan Nationalism and Sino-Tibetan 
Relations, Colorado, Westview Press, 1996. 
Sperling, E., ‘The Yuan Dynasty (1279-1368)’, in A. Blondeau and K. Buffetrille (ed.), 
Authenticating Tibet: Answers to China’s 100 Questions, Los Angeles, University of 
California Press, 2008, pp. 11-18. 
Uebach, H., ‘The Tibetan Empire (Seventh-Ninth Centuries)’, in A. Blondeau and K. 
Buffetrille (ed.), Authenticating Tibet: Answers to China’s 100 Questions, Los Angeles, 
University of California Press, 2008, pp. 3-11. 
Secondary Sources: 
Anand, D., ‘The Tibet Question and the West: Issues of Sovereignty, Identity, and 
Representation,’ in B. Sautman and J.T. Dreyer (ed.), Contemporary Tibet: Politics, 
Development and Society in a Disputed Region, New York, M.E. Sharpe, 2006, pp. 
285-304. 
Anand, D., ‘Western Colonial Representations of the Other: The Case of Exotica Tibet’, 
New Political Science, vol. 29, no. 1, 2007, pp. 23-42. 
Anand, D., Geopolitical Exotica: Tibet in Western Imagination, Minneapolis, 
University of Minnesota Press, 2007. 
Barnett, R., ‘Violated Specialness: Western Political Representations of Tibet’, in T. 
Dodin and H. Räther (ed.), Imagining Tibet: Perceptions, Projections and Fantasies, 
Boston, Wisdom Publications, 2001, pp. 269-316. 
50 
 
Brewer, A., Marxist Theories of Imperialism: A Critical Survey, 2nd edn, London, 
Routledge, 1990. 
Ch’en, K., ‘Chinese Communist Attitudes Towards Buddhism in Chinese History’, in 
A. Feuerwerker (ed.), History in Communist China, Massachusetts, M.I.T. Press, 1968, 
pp. 158-174. 
Dirlik, A., Revolution and History: Origins of Marxist Historiography in China, 1919-
1937, Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1978. 
Duara, P., ‘Postcolonial History’, in S. Maza and L. Kramer (ed.), A Companion to 
Western Historical Thought, Oxford, Blackwell Publishers, 2002, pp. 417-431. 
Gyaltsen, S.S., The Clear Mirror: A Traditional Account of Tibet’s Golden Age, trans. 
M. Taylor and C. Yuthok, New York, Snow Lion Publications, 1996. 
Kaschewsky, R., ‘The Image of Tibet in the West Before the Nineteenth Century’, in T. 
Dodin and H. Räther (ed.), Imagining Tibet: Perceptions, Projections and Fantasies, 
Boston, Wisdom Publications, 2001, pp. 3-20. 
Kiernan, V.G., Marxism and Imperialism, London, Edward Arnold, 1974 
Lopez Jr., D.S., Prisoners of Shangri-La: Tibetan Buddhism and the West, Chicago, 
University of Chicago Press, 1998. 
Marx, K., Critique of Hegel’s “Philosophy of Right”’, trans. A. Jolin and J. O’Malley, 
London, Cambridge University Press, 1967. 
McKay, A.C., ‘”Truth”, Perception, and Politics: The British Construction of an Image 
of Tibet’, in T. Dodin and H. Räther (ed.), Imagining Tibet: Perceptions, Projections 
and Fantasies, Boston, Wisdom Publications, 2001, pp. 67-90. 
51 
 
Norbu, D., Culture and the politics of Third World nationalism, London, Routledge, 
1992. 
Powers, J., History as Propaganda: Tibetan Exiles versus the People’s Republic of 
China, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2004. 
‘Presentism’, Oxford English Dictionary, 2015, 
http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/266885?redirectedFrom=presentism&, (accessed 13 
October 2015). 
Rinpoche, D.K., ‘Buddhism in the West and the Image of Tibet’, in T. Dodin and H. 
Räther (ed.), Imagining Tibet: Perceptions, Projections and Fantasies, Boston, Wisdom 
Publications, 2001, pp. 379-388. 
Sullivan, L.R., ‘The Controversy over “Feudal Despotism”: Politics and Historiography 
in China, 1978-82’, in J. Unger (ed.), Using the Past to Serve the Present: 
Historiography and Politics in Contemporary China, London, M. E. Sharpe, 1993, pp. 
174-204. 
 
